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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEAH C. JONES, MARTHA C. 
WHITING AND LOUISE c. 
BEETON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
MARK B. COOK, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE No. 7 424 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiffs and appellants prosecute this appeal from 
a judgment made and entered in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiffs on the 24th day of June, 1949. 
( J. R. 29) Notice of appeal was served and filed on 
September 16, 1949. ( J. R. 36) Most of the evidence 
is documentary. The only substantial conflict in the 
evidence is whether or not Mark Cook, the deceased 
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father of the parties hereto, prior to his death made 
a gift of a Ford automobile to his son l\{ark B. Cook. 
The action was brought by the plaintiffs against 
the defendant by filing a complaint on l\fay 22, 1948. 
By the complaint the plaintiffs claimed to be the owners 
and entitled to the possession of one Ford Sedan auto-
mobile, Motor No. 6441914 of the value of $1000.00, 
which was converted by the defendant to his own use and 
benefit to the damage of the plaintiffs in the sum of 
$1000.00 for \vhich amount plaintiffs prayed judgment 
against the defendant. ( J. R. 1) 
To the complaint the defendant answered. By his 
ans"\\rer he denies the ownership of the automobile by 
the plaintiffs. He further alleges that his father died 
on July 30, 1943; that on July 1st, 1944 the last will 
and test·ament of his father was admitted to probate 
and he wa~ appointed executor of the will; that he 
qualified as such executor and on August 18, 1948 a 
decree of distribution was entered and that he was 
finally discharged as executor on September 15, 1945; 
that ·an inventory and appraisement of the estate was 
filed in which the automobile was not listed; that the 
property of the estate was appraised but the automobile 
was not listed or appraised for the purpose of fixing 
inheritance taxes; that no objection was made by the 
widow or children of the dece,ased because the automobile 
was not listed; that an account was filed with the court 
in which the estate of Mark Cook, deceased, was being 
probated; that no objections were made thereto; that 
Irene B. Cook, the widow of the deceased gave a RECEIPT 
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To ~lark B. Cook "?herein she ackno,vledged thP rereipt 
of the property 'Yhich 'Yas distributed to her; that the 
plaintiffs kne'"' that ~lark B. Cook clairned the autornobile 
and that he had possession thereof~ that neither the 
wido" ... of the deceased nor the plaintiffs filed objection 
to the account or the proceedings had in the course 
of the probating of the estate of Mark Cook, that after 
the death of Irene B. Cook, and on or about June 21, 
1947, the defendant herein filed a suit against the plain-
tiffs herein and then in that suit for the first tirne 
plaintiffs, as executrices of the estate of Irene B. Cook 
claimed to be the owners of said automobile. That 
notices of the various probate proceedings were given 
as by la\Y required. That by reason of the facts alleged 
by the defendant herein the plaintiffs are estopped 
from claiming the automobile and that any claim that 
the plaintiffs may have had in or to the automobile is 
res adjudicata. 
As a further defense the defendant alleges in his 
answer that plaintiffs ·alleged cause of action is barred 
under and by virtue of Title 104, Chapter 2, Sub-
division 2 of Section 24, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
N(n, ... here in the answer does the defendant affirmativelv 
"' 
allege ownership of the automobile in himself by reason 
of a gift by his father. So far ·as is disclosed by the 
answer defendant claims ownership of the automobile 
hy reason of the probate proceedings notwithstanding 
the dec-ree of distribution did not order the automobile 
distributed to the defendant herein. (J. R. 7 to 14) 
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To the answer of the defendant . the plaintiffs filed 
a reply in which they admit the . ·allegations of the 
defendant touching the p·robate proceedings. They also 
admit that Mark B. Cook, the defendant, during the~ 
time he was acting as executor had possession of the 
automobile as by law permitted; that Irene B. Cook 
held ,a life estate in said automobile until the date of 
her death which occurred on September 14, 1946. 
Plaintiffs in their reply denied generally the other 
allegations of the answer of Mark B. Cook. (J. R. 15 
to 17) 
We have at some length directed the attention of 
the court to the pleadings because many of the pleaded 
facts, particularly those relating to the probate pro-
ceedings, are not and may not be contradicted. 
The parole evidence is directed prim·arily to the 
question of whether or not Mark Cook, during his life-
time made a gift of the property to his son Mark B. 
Cook. It probably should be noted at the outset that 
the trial court refused to make a finding on that ques-
tion. However, we deem it necessary to direct the at-
tention of the court to that phase of the case as other-
wise the court might conclude that in the absence of 
evidence showing or tending to show that the auto-
mobile belonged to Mark Cook at the time of his death 
the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case. 
Before referring to the oral testimony the atten-
tion of the court is directed to the terms of the will 
of Mark Cook, deceased. The will of Mark Cook and 
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his \Yife Irene B. Cook \YH~ read into the record and 
"~in be found in the tran~eript at pages 27 to 29 of the 
transcript. It 'vill be noted that Irene B. Cook if she 
surYiYed her husband, \Yhich she did, \Vas given a life 
estate in all the real property belonging to her husband 
at the time of her death. 
~lark B. Cook the son, was given, subject to the 
life estate of Irene B. Cook, the real property, the 
water stock, farm machinery and implements used in 
connection with the farm. The plaintiffs were given, 
share and share alike, subject to the life estate of the 
mother Irene B. Cook all of the rest, residue and re-
mainder of the property of every name and nature. 
(Tr. 27 and 28) 
By the decree of distribution there was distributed 
to Irene B. Cook a life estate in all of the property 
owned by her deceased husband, Mark Cook. 
There was distributed to Mark B. Cook, defendant 
herein, subject to the life estate of Irene B. Cook, the 
real estate, water stock, farming machinery and equip-
ment. 
Leah C. Jones, M·artha C. Whiting and Louise C. 
Beeton were decreed, share and share alike, subject to 
the life estate of Irene B. Cook all the rest, residue and 
remainder of the estate. What constitutes the resr, 
residue and remainder is not listed. 
It is also provided in the decree of distribution 
that: "any and all other property not n0\\7 kno-vvn or 
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discovered which may belong to said estate or in which 
said estate 1nay have any interest be and the same 
is hereby distributed in accordance with said last "Till 
and testament. (Tr. 31 to 34) 
The evidence shows ''Tithout conflict that the auto-
mobile at the time of the death of l\1ark Cook and 
at all times since his death stood in his name in the 
office of the State Tax Commission. (See Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit "A") The signature on the certificate of 
registration in 1941 is that of Mark Cook, deceased. 
(Tr. 6) The other signatures of 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 
and 1946 are the signatures of Mark B. Cook, the de-
fendant herein. (Tr. 80) The evidence also shows 
that the defendant in all of the probate proceedings of 
his father signed his name as Mark B. Cook. He so 
signed his name gener·ally. (Tr. 81) 
In addition to the certifieate of registration stand-
ing in the name of Mark Cook the evidence shows that 
defendant Mark B. Cook was familiar \\rith the pro-
cedure in order to transfer title. (Tr. 81) No claim 
is made that the certificate of ownership was ever 
signed by Mark Cook, the father of the parties herein. 
The evidence is to the contrary. (See photostatic copy 
of certificate of ownership, defendant's Exhibit 1.) 
In addition to the foreg-oing evidence plaintiff Leah 
C. Jones testified that her father died on July 30, 1943 
·and her mother on September 14, 1946. That during 
his lifetime her father had in his possession the 1941 
model Ford sedan. (Tr. 5) That in December, 1943, 
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after the death of her father as her mother \Yas about 
to go to Arizona ~Iark B. Cook told his mother that 
it would be necessary for him, l\Iark B. Cook, to have 
the certificate of o'vnership of the Ford automobile 
in order to cross the state line into Arizona and that 
later the mother, Irene B. Cook, told l\Irs. Jones that 
she had giYen the certificate of ovvnership of the Ford 
to Mark. (Tr. 108-109) 
Mrs. Jones further testified that she had not seen 
the decree of distribution until the day of the trial. ( Tr. 
110) That she went to the place vvhere and at th~ 
time when the hearing was had for the purposes of 
appraising the prop.erty for inheritance tax purposes. 
That she \Yas told that there was no reason for her to 
remain and she left. (Tr. 111) That she did see a copy 
of the decree approving and allovving the Final Account 
of the executor and petition for final distribution of the 
estate among her mother's papers after her death. 
(Tr. 111) That in February, 1945, she vvrote a letter 
to find out in vYhose name the ai1tomobile stood. 
Martha C. Whiting testified that she went to the 
office of Judge Christenson, vvho represented Mark B. 
Cook, as executor of the estate of Mark Cook, and that 
she inquired about the automobile and was told by 
Judge Christenson that Mark had a right to use the 
automobile while he was acting as executor. (Tr. 121) 
~Irs. Whiting further testified that after the death of 
her father Mark came to his mother for the keys to 
thP car and the mother gave them to him. (Tr. 43) 
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The evidence also shows that Irene B. Cook had 
the automobile insured in the name of Irene B. Cook 
after the death of her husband that she paid the insur-
ance premium. Prior to the death of Mark Cook jn 
June, 1943 he insured the automobile in the name of 
Mark Cook. (Tr. 37) 
Notwithstanding there is no allegation in the an-
swer to the effect that defendant Mark B. Cook paid 
the taxes on the automobile he testified that he paid 
the taxes for the years 1944, 1945, 1946, 194 7, 1948 
and 1949. (Tr. 56) 
Mrs. Cook, the wife of the defendant, testified that, 
at a time not fixed in her direct examination, she and 
her husband, Mark B. Cook and her father-in-law Mark 
Cook, took a ride up. Provo Canyon and Mr. Cook, the 
elder, said: ''Mark, here is the certificate of owner-
ship and extra set of keys to the car. I'm giving it to 
you with the understanding that you take Mother and 
I at any time we want to go." (Tr. 94) It will be 
observed that there is no allegation in defendant's an-
swer to the effect that the automobile was given to hirn 
by his father. The evidence further shows that Mark 
B. Cook took his mother to Arizona after the death 
of his father but refused to permit the car to be used 
to take Mrs. Cook to Logan. (T-r. 131) 
From the foregoing brief statement of the evidence 
it will be seen that such evidence is ample, if not con-
clusive, to show that the automobile was ·a part of the 
estate of Mark Cook at the time of his death. 
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,, ... e are mindful that this eourt Ina~· not reYiP"\\. the 
conflicting evidence and determine the question of 
'vhether or not the anton1obile belonged to thP estate 
at the time of the death of ~lark Cook. Ho,YevE)r if the 
evidence is conclusive that the autoinobile belonged to 
the estate or if it should adopt the vie-vv expressed in 
the dissenting opinion in the case of Jackson vs. Ja1nes, 
97 Utah 41, 89 Pac. ( 2d) 235, then and in such case the 
plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment for $800.00, the 
stipulated value of the automobile. ( Trs. 50-51) 
In the Findings of Fact the trial court expressly 
refused to make a finding as to whether or not Mark 
Cook had made a gift to his son Mark B. Cook. (J. R. 
page 21) The court based its judgment upon (1) the 
fact that in the probate proceedings the plaintiffs made 
no objections; and (2) upon the fact that the defendant 
had possession of and paid the taxes upon the auto-
mobile. (J. R. 20 to 29) 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERR,QR 
Come now the plaintiffs in the above entitled action 
and assign the following errors upon which they rely 
for a reversal of the judgment made and entered on 
June 24, 1949 in the above entitled cause. 
1. The trial court erred in that part of its finding 
of Fact No. 1 wherein it found: ''that defendant has 
been in possession of said automobile with the kno"\\Tledge 
of the plaintiffs, under claim in good faith made by 
the defendant that said automobile has been given to 
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the defendant by the said 1\Iark Cook as a gift." That 
such finding is without support in the evidence and is 
contrary to the preponderance thereof. (J. R. 21) 
2. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding No. 2 wherein it is in effect found that no men-
tion \Yas made in the \Vill of the auto1nobile involved 
in this action. That such finding is without support in 
the evidence and is contrary to the clear preponderance 
thereof. (J. R. 21) 
3. The trial court erred in making that part of 
finding of fact numbered 10 wherein it found: ''That 
during or before the month of February, 1945 and long 
prior to the date of said decree the plaintiffs had full 
knowledge of the individual claim of the defendant to 
the ownership of said automobile, and of the defendant's 
possession thereof pursuant to said claim, and that 
when said decree was made and entered, the said auto-
mobile and the facts with respect to defendant's clairn 
thereto were and had been kno\vn and discovered''. 
That such finding is without support in the evidence 
·and is contrary to the preponderance thereof. (J. R. 25) 
4. The trial court erred in making that part of find-
ing numbered_ 11 wherein it found that the defendant 
delivered to Irene B. Cook all of the residue of the 
property belonging to the estate of said deceased. That 
such finding is without support in the evidence and is 
contrary to the clear preponderance thereof. (J. R. 25) 
5. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 14 wherein it found that notwith-
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standing· their kno,vledge thnt the defendant elain1PJ 
said autornobile as his ow·,n personal propert~· and h~· 
Yirtue of said claim the plaintiff8 herein or either of 
them haYe eYer made or filed any objection or prote~t 
on account of the failure of n[ark B. Cook, as executor 
or other,Yise, to list the said automobile or to report 
to the inheritance tax appraisers. That such finding 
is vvithout support in the evidence and is contrary to 
the clear preponderance thereof. ( J. R. 26) 
6. The trial court erred by in effect finding that 
the plaintiffs are estopped to claim any right, title or 
interest in said automobile involved in this action to-wit: 
that certain Ford sedan automobile, Motor No. 6441914, 
and that the decree of final distribution is res adjudicata 
with respect to said automobile. That such finding i3 
without support in the evidence and is contrary to the 
clear preponderance thereof. ( J. R. 27) 
7. The trial court erred in making its finding riurn-
bered 16 wherein it found that for more than three 
years immediately prior to the commencement of this 
action the defendant Mark B. Cook has had and held 
in good faith the open, notorious and adverse possession 
of said automobile hereinabove referred to, and de-
scribed and involved in this action, under a claim of 
individual right and with the kno,Yledge of the plain-
tiffs and said possession and claim, and that said canst~ 
of action of the plain tiffs herein is barred under and 
by· virtue of Title 104, Chapter 2, Subdivision 2 of 
Section 24, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. That such 
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finding is without support in the evidence and is con-
trary to the clear preponderance thereof. ( J. R. 27) 
8. The trial court erred in making its first conclusion 
of law wherein it concluded that plaintiffs are estopped 
to claim any right, title or interest in sai~ automobile 
and that the decree of distribution is res adjudicata as 
to the right of the plaintiffs to recover the value of 
said automobile. That such conclusion of law is without 
support in either the evidence or the findings of fact 
and is contrary to law. (J. R. 27) 
9. The trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law numbered 2 in that such conclusion of law .is 
without support in the findings of fact or conclusions 
of law and is contrary to law. (J. R. 27) 
10. The trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law numbered 3 in that such conclusion of law is 
without support in the evidence or the findings of fact 
and is contrary to law. (J. R. 28) 
11. The trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law numbered 4 in that such conclusion of law is 
without support in the findings of fact or conclusions 
of law and is contrary to law. (J. R. 28) 
12. The trial court erred in awarding judgment dis-
missing plaintiffs' complaint. ( J. R. 29) 
13. The trial court erred in a warding costs to the 
defendant. 
14. The trial court erred in adrrii tting in evidence 
over plaintiffs' objection the verification to the inven-
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tory and apprai~enlPnt filed in the ca8e of l\Iark Coole 
(Tr. G~) 
15. The trial court erred in failing to find upon the 
question of \Yhether or not a gift of the automobile \Va~ 
made by Mark Cook to his son l\Iark B. Coole (J. R. 21) 
16. The trial court erred in failing to find that Mark 
Cook did not make a valid gift of the automobile to 
Mark B. Cook. 
17. The trial court erred in failing to find for 
plaintiffs and in failing to avvard plaintiffs judgment 
against the defendant for the sum of $800.00. 
ARGUMENT 
In our view there are three main questions pre-
sen ted by this appeal. They are : 
First: Does the decree of distribution distribute 
the automobile to the plaintiffs herein~ 
Second: May an executor of an estate acquire title 
to either real or personal property of an estate or 
deprive the persons entitled to such property of all 
rights therein by neglecting to place the same in an 
inventory and appraisement and otherwise failing to 
account therefor~ 
Third: May an executor by paying taxes on tht~ 
property of an estate which he is administering acquire 
title to such property by adverse possession~ 
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IN LEGAL EFFECT THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION IN 
THIS CASE DISTRIBUTED THE REVERSIO·NARY INTER-
EST, IF ANY, OF THE ESTATE OF MARK COOK IN AND 
TO THE AUTOMOBILE TO THE PLAITIFFS HEREIN. 
U.C.A. 1943, 101-3-9 provides: 
''In ·a specific devise or legacy the title passes 
by the will, but possession can only be obtained 
from the personal representative; and he may be 
authorized by the court to sell the property de-
vised and bequeathed in the cases herein pro-
vided.'' 
A similar provision is contained in the law of succession. 
U.C.A. 1943, 101-4-2. 
The will of Mark Cook and his \Vife Irene B. Cook 
devised and bequeathed to Irene B. Cook a life estate 
in all of the property owned by Mark Cook and to Mark 
B. Cook the reversionary interest in the real estate, 
farming machinery and "rater stock and to Leah C. 
Jones, !fartha C. Whiting and Louise C. Beeton, share 
and share alike, all of the rest, residue and remainder 
of their estates of every name and nature. (Tr. 29) 
The decree of distribution distributed the property 
to the persons entitled thereto ''as des.cribed in the 
decree, and any and all other p·roperty not now known 
or discovered which may belong to said estate or ln 
which said estate may have any interest he and the 
same is hereby distributed ~ accordance with said last 
will and testament." (Tr. 30 and 31) 
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It "·ill thus be seen thn t th~ reYersionary interest 
in the automobile 'Ya~ bequeathed to the plaintiff and 
the decree of distribution is broad enough to include 
any and all interest that :Jiark Cook, deceased, had in 
the automobile. 
In construing a decree of distribution recourse as . 
to its Ineaning· may be had to the will and if there_ is 
any ambig·nity or any matters are omitted the terms of 
the "·ill are incorporated into the decree of distribution. 
34 C.J.S. 453 and cases cited in the foot note. The case 
of In re: Effersons' Estate, 259 Pac. 919; 70 Utah 258 
is among the cases there cited. It is clear that the 
automobile ,,·as not distributed to the defendant and if 
it 'vas not distributed to the plaintiffs, any interest or 
title of :\lark Cook, deceased, remains suspended in 
mid air. The trial court did not find that the automobile 
belonged to the defendant, and so far as the record 
title is shown in the office of the State Tax Commission 
the automobile is still owned by Mark Cook, deceased. 
The provisions of Article 4, U.~C.A .. 1943, 57-Ba.-62 re-
quires that one '\vho claims to be the owner of a motor 
vehicle which he operates upon the public roads of this 
state must be the registered owner of such automobite 
so opera ted. 
From what has been said it follows that if the 
plaintiffs have been divested of the right, if any, that 
}lark Cook had in the automobile it must be because 
they did something or failed to do something resulting 
in their becoming divested of such title or interest. 
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PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ESTOPPED FROM BRINGING 
THEIR ACTION IN CONVERSIO·N FOR THE VALUE 
OF THE AUTOMOBILE. 
By assignments numbered 1, 3, 5, 7 the plaintiffs 
attack the findings of the trial court to the effect that 
the plaintiffs knew that Mark B. Cook claimed to be the 
owner of the property before, during and after he 
became the ap~pointed and acting executor of his father's 
estate. An examination of the evidence will show that 
such finding is wholly without support in the evidence. 
The evidence is to the contrary. The facts disclosed 
by the evidence are these : The certificate of ownership 
at all times stood in the name of Mark Cook in the 
office of the State Tax Commission "Without there ever 
having been any transfer to Mark B. Cook or anyone 
else. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits "A" and "B". Tr. 6-7-8) 
Up to the time of the death of Mark Cook the automobile 
was at all times kept in his garage and was also kept 
there part of the time after his death. (Tr. 5-10) In 
February, 1945 Mrs. Jones wrote to the Tax Commission 
and learned that the automobile had not been trans-
ferred from her father's name. (Tr. 13) Mrs. Jones 
knew that Mark was driving the car because her mother 
could not drive a car. (Tr. 14) Mrs. Jones knew that 
her mother claimed a life estate in the car. (Tr. 21) 
Hilton A. Robertson testified that he insured the auto-
mobile in the name of Irene B. Cook after Mark Cook's 
death and in Mark Cook's name before he died. (Tr. 
36-39) Mrs. Whiting testified that after her father'~ 
death Mark came to his mother and secured the keys 
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to the automobile. (Tr. 4~) )Irs. 'Vhiting testified 
that nlark refused to let hi~ mother take the car to 
go to Logan about July :24, 1944. (Tr. 47-48) That the 
car "~as in the garage at the home of ~{r. and Mrs. 
J\Iark Cook ( 49), but after Mrs. Cook went to Ari-
zona the car 'Yas gradually kept more of the time at 
~lark B. Cook's residence. 
:Jiark Cook testified that part of the time after he 
claimed he had possession of the certificate of owner-
ship it was kept in his father's garage. (Tr. 86) He 
further testified that he had never told his sisters that 
he had the certificate of title to the automobile. (Tr. 90) 
Both Mrs. Jones and Mrs. Whiting testified that 
they had no actual knowledge of what was contained 
in the inventory and appraisement or the decree of 
distribution until after the death of their mother. (Tr. 
110 and 122) 
The foregoing contains a summary of all the evi-
dence we are able to find in the record touching the 
claimed knowledge of the p~laintiffs that Mark B. Cook 
claimed to be the owner of the automobile. None of 
such evidence lends support to the findings to the effect 
that plaintiffs had any knowledge that defendant claimed 
to be the owner of the automobile. All of the evidence 
is to the contrary. The fact that Mark B. Cook had 
possession of the automobile may not be said to advise 
or even tend to give notice to the plaintiffs that de-
fendant claimed the automobile. The plaintiffs '""ere 
not in any event entitled to the possession of the auto-
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mobile until the death of their mother which occurred 
~ 
on September 14, 1946. (Tr. 6) Mark Cook was in no 
condition to drive the automobile for some time before 
his death (Tr. 9), and Mrs. Cook was unable to drive 
an automobile. (Tr. 14) Thus if the plaintiffs are 
estopped from claiming the automobile or its value 
it must be because they failed to assert their rights in 
the probate proceedings. It should be observed that 
"rhen the probate p~roceedings were being had it vvas 
a matter of sheer speculation as to whether the plain-
tiffs would ever receive any right of value in the auto-
mobile. It may well have been worn out before their 
right to its possession vested in them. 
It has repeatedly been held by the courts of record 
1n California that the settlement of an executor's ac-
count and the allowance thereof by the court in the 
absence of an appeal is conclusive against all persons 
interested in the estate but only as to such matters a.~ 
"\\rere actually included in the account or objections 
thereto and actually passed upon by the court. Son tag 
vs. Swperior Court, in and for Los Angeles ~County, 36 
Pac. (2d) 140; Wallis vs. Walker, 37 Cal. 424; 99 Am. 
Dec. 290; Tobelmarn vs. Hildebrandt, 72 Cal. 315, 14 Pac. 
20; Estate of Adams, 131 Cal. 415, 63 Pac. 838; Estate 
of Ross, 179 Cal. 335; 182 Pac. 303; Estate of :Clary, 203 
Cal. 335; 264 Pac. 242; In re: Evans Estate, 144 Pac. 
(2d) 625. 
We are mindful that under the provisions of U.C.A. 
1943, 102-11-37, 'vhich is taken from the California 
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Code, the ~ettle1nent of an account of an executor or 
administrator is, in the absenre of fraud, conclusive 
as to all matters stated in the account and as to 1natters 
'Yhirh have been litigated in the probate proeeeding. 
It 'Yas so held In re: Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128; 158 
Pac. 705. In the case of fraud such doctrine does not 
apply. Weyant vs. Utah Savings and Trust Contpany, 
54 Utah 181; 182 Pac. 189. 
In the case of In re: Rice's Estate, ______ Utah ______ ; 
182 Pac. (2d) 111, there is reviewed a number of Utah 
cases dealing \Yith the question of whether or not a 
proceeding for the determination of the title to prop-
erty claimed by the estate and also claimed by some 
one else must be tried in the probate matter or by an 
ordinary action at law or suit in equity. The conclusion 
is reached that it might be triecl as a part of the probate 
proceeding or as an independent action and cases holding 
that the case may not be tried as a. part of the probate 
proceeding are overruled. In the course of the opinion 
it is said on page 117 of 182 Pac. (2d) that a decree 
of distribution in probate p~roceedings after due and 
legal notice, by a court having jurisdiction of subject 
matter is conclusive as to the funds, property, items 
and matters covered by and properly included within 
the decree until set aside or modified by the court enter-
ing the decree in the manner prescribed by law or until 
reversed on appeal. 
In that case the court cites U.C.A. 194.3, 102-11-37 
hereinbefore referred to and also U.C.A. 194.3, 102-14-23. 
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The latter provision provides that mistakes in settlement 
may be corrected at any time before final settlement 
and discharge and after that time by an action in equity 
on such showing as will justify the interference of 
the court. 
In this case nothing was said about the automobile 
in the probate proceedings. The court certainly did not 
distribute the automobile to the defendant. As ·we have 
heretofore pointed out any interest which Mark Cook 
had in the automobile after the death of Irene B. Cook 
was distributed to the plaintiffs. 
The language of the decree of distribution wherein 
it states that there is distributed to Leah C. Jones, 
Martha C. Whiting and Louise C. Beeton, daughters of 
said deceased, the reversionary interest in and to all 
the rest, residue and remainder of the estate of said 
deceased in equal, undivided shares clearly includes 
everything belonging to the estate not devised or be-
queathed to Mark B. Cook. The automobile is included 
within such language just as clearly as the other personal 
property which was bequeathed to the plaintiffs. 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES ADJUDICATA DOES NOT PRE-
CLUDE THE PLAINTIFFS FROM MAINTAINING THIS 
ACTION. 
Most of what we have said under the preceding 
heading is applicable to the claim that the title to the 
automobile has been adjudicated, as we understand 
defendant's position, in his favor. There is a total 
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absence of any language in the decree of distribution 
a'Yarding· the automobile to the defendant. As "'e have 
heretofore pointed out the decree of distribution a"rard~1 
to the plaintiffs the reYersionary interest of all prop-
erty of the e~tate not a'Yarded to the defendant. 
The authorities are generally to the effect that 
"~here the legal title to property stands in the name 
of the decedent it is the duty of the executor or adminis-
trator to include the same in the inventory and appraise-
ment, especially where the claim is made by the repre-
sentative. 33 C.J.,S .. 1088, and cases cited in foot note. 
That such is the duty of an executor or administrator 
in the case of an automobile seems to be essential under 
the provisions of our motor vehicle law. U.,C.A. 1943, 
Article 4, Sec. 57-32-62. 
If the defendant in this case had placed the auto-
Inobile in his inventory and then sought to have the 
same distributed to him the other persons interested 
in the estate would have had notice of such claim and 
been given an opportunity to resist the same. Under 
the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case and the 
law applicable to said evidence as announced by the 
trial court an administrator may acquire title to prop-
erty by failing to list the same in the inventory and if 
the persons entitled to the property fail to discover the 
neglect then they are precluded from recovering that 
to which they are justly entitled. Such doctrine is at 
war vvith well established principles of law. An executor 
or administrator occupies a fiduciary relation to the 
persons entitled to the proceeds of the estate 'vhich he 
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is administering and if he claims any interest adverse 
to others interested in the estate it is his duty and 
obligation to bring home to them his adverse claim. 
In this case there is nothing which shows or tends to 
shovv that the defendant claimed the automobile until 
after the death of Irene B. Cook. 
The recent case of Austin Rice vs .. Erma Rice, Ex-
ecutrix and Trustee in the Ma·tter of the Estate of David 
L. Rice, deceased, decided by this court on December 
21, 1949, but not yet reported or final, announces 
principles of law which are applicable here. In this 
case, as in the Rice case, the executor did not ·mention 
to the court that Mark Cook left an automobile standing 
in his name. Nor did he inform the appellants that he 
claimed the automobile. On the contrary he signed his 
father's name to the certificate of registration which 
'vas calculated to mislead the appellants to believe 
that he recognized the ownership of the automobile 
to be in his father. Defendant did not seek to have the 
automobile distributed to himself. On the contrary he 
failed and neglected to inform the court that the legal 
title to the automobile stood in the name of his father. 
Moreover as we have heretofore pointed out the decree 
of distribution distributes to the appellants herein ''the 
reversionary interest in and to all of the rest, residue 
and remainder of the estate." 
The automobile, if it belonged to Mark Cook, having 
been distributed to and vested in the appellants. upon 
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the death of their mother there "·as no ocea~1on to 
have the decree of distribution amended. The derree 
vested the o'Ynership of the automobile in appellants 
the same as it vested in them the ownership of the other 
personal property. That being so and the respondent 
having· appropriated the automobile to his own use the 
appellants elected to bring this action in conversion. 
PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION IS NOT 
BARRED BY THE PLEADED STATUTE OF LIMITATION. 
There are three reasons why the provisions of 
T,itle 104, Chapter 2, Subdivision 2 of Section 24, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, are not available as a defense 
to this action. They are: 
First: An executor or administrator may not ac-
quire title to property vvhich he is administering by 
adverse possession. 53 C.J.S. page 954, Sec. 19; 54 C.J.S. 
Sec. 6, page 162; 34 C.J.S. Sec. 733, page 756 and cases 
cited in foot notes. See also Hatch vs. Hatch, 46 Utah 
116, 148 Pac. 1096. 
The decree of distribution in this case was signed 
and filed on September 5, 1945. (J. R. 24) Mark B. 
Cook was discharged as executor on September 12, 1945. 
(J. R. 25) The complaint in this action was filed on 
May 22, 1948, summons was served on the defendant 
on May 22, 1948. It will thus be seen that the action 
was commenced wrell within three years after the decree 
of distribution vvas made and filed: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
Second: Moreover the plaintiffs were not entitled 
to the possession of the automobile until the death of 
their mother which occurred on September 14, 194·6. 
( Tr. 5) These appellants could not be heard to complain 
if Irene B. Cook, who held. a life estate in the automobile 
saw fit to permit her son Mark to use the automobile. 
Nor were the plaintiffs required to make inquiry as to 
who was paying the taxes. While Mark B. Cook was 
acting as executor it was his duty to pay the taxes and 
after his discharge it was the duty of Mrs. Cook to 
pay the taxes. If she was content to let Mark pay 
the taxes for such use as he made of the automobile 
it was no concern of these appellants. They were with-
out the right to maintain the action until they were 
entitled to the possession of the automobile and prob-
ably not until they made demand for the possession of 
the automobile. 46 Am .. Jur., page 33, Sec. 55. Also 
53 Am. Jur., page 945, Sec. 181. 
Demand for possession was not made by the plain-
tiffs until on or about May 12, 1948. (Defendant's Ex-
hibit 4) 
Third : One who conceals property or the owner-
ship thereof may not he heard to plead the bar of the 
statute of limitations during such time as he conceals 
such ownership, or one who conceals the existence of a 
cause of action may not be heard to plead the bar of 
the statute of limitations during the time of such con-
cealment, especially where there is a fiduciary relation. 
54 C.J.S .. 221; Peteler vs. Robison, 81 Utah 535; 17 Pac. 
(2d) 244. 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ON ALL 
ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS AND IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO 
A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR THE 
SUM OF EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS. 
As we have heretofore in this brief pointed out the 
trial court failed and refused to find on the question 
of whether or not the claimed gift was ever made by 
Mark Cook to his son Mark B. Cook. We have assigned 
such failure as error in assignments 15, 16 and 17. 
It has been repeatedly held by this court that it 
is error for the trial court to fail to find on all material 
issues. Among the numerous cases so holding are : 
Everett vs. Jones, 32 Utah 489; 91 Pac. 360; Prows vs. 
Hawley, 72 Utah 444; 271 Pac. 31; Belnap vs. Fox, 69 
Utah 15; 251 Pac. 1073; Hatch vs. Baker, 70 Utah 1; 
257 Pac. 673. 
If a finding is not rna terial or if the evidence is 
such that a finding, if made, must be against the p~arty 
complaining then and in such case the error is not 
prejudicial and the failure to find on all issues will 
not result in a reversal of the judgment. 
VVe have heretofore set out the evidence touching 
the claimed gift and also the evidence in conflict there-
with. We shall not repeat all of such evidence, except 
to observe that the same is not sufficient to support a 
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finding that Mark Cook made a valid gift of the auto-
roo bile. In order to be effectual a gift must be fully 
·executed, for the reason that there being no considera-
tion therefore no action will lie to enforce it. Wood vs. 
Wood, 87 Utah 394; 49 Pac. (2d) 416; Helper State 
Bank vs. ;Creer, 95 Utah 320; 81 Pac. (2d) 359; Holman 
vs. Deseret Savings Bank, 41 Utah 340; 124 Pac. 765; 
Christensen V'S. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 478; 286 
Pac. 638. See also 38 C.J.S. page 793, S-ec.- 16. 
It is said in the Holman case that to constitute a 
gift inter vivos the donor must be divested of, and the 
donee invested with the right of property in the subject 
matter of the gift. It must be absolute, irrevocable, 
without any reference to its taking place at some future 
period. The donor must deliver the property and part 
with all present and future dominion over it. 
In this case the defendant must prevail, if at all, 
on the oral testimony of Mrs. Mark Cook wherein she 
testified that Mark Cook said to his son: "Mark, here is 
the certificate of ownership and extra set of keys to 
the car. I'm giving it to you with the understanding 
that you take Mother and I at any time we want to go." 
(Tr. 94) That Mr. Cook then handed to Mark the 
extra set of keys and the certificate of o·wnership. It 
will be observed that the gift was conditioned upon 
Mark taking the father and mother for a ride \Yhenever 
they wanted to go. 
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There is nothing- in the evidence that 1Iark B. Cook 
accepted the gift. The authorities teach that there 
must be: ''An unmistakable and unconditional accept-
ance on the part of the donee to the validity of a gift 
inter vivos. It is immaterial whether delivery and ac-
ceptance are contemp-oraneous or 'vhich precedes the 
other, acceptance need not be immediate, it is sufficient 
if the gift is accepted before revocation by death or 
otherwise. 38 C.J., page 807-808, Sec .. 29. 
' 
On cross examination Mrs. Mark B. Cook gave the 
following answer to the following question : '' Q. All 
right, as I recall your testimony, it was this: That he 
stated to Mark that he would give him the car if he 
would take the father and the mother out for a ride 
when they wanted to go~ A. Not if, with the under-
standing that we would take them, or Mark would take 
them "\Yhen they wanted to go. (Tr. 99)" 
There is no evidence that Mark B. Cook accepted 
the gift before the death of his father. There is evi-
dence that he repudiated the conditions accompanying 
the gift when he refused to take his mother to Logan 
or to permit the use of the automobile for such pur-
pose. (Tr. 97) (Tr. 131) Thus according to defendant's 
own evidence Mark B. Cook was not given the absolute 
possession of the automobile. Such possession as he 
had was at all times subject to the right of the father 
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and mother to the use of the car when they desired 
to go for a ride. So also is there an absence of any evi-
dence that Mark B. Cook accepted the claimeed gift 
but on the contrary the evidence shows tha.t Mark B. 
Cook refused to comply with the conditions imposed 
as a condition of the gift, not to mention the other 
evidence showing that a gift was not made. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE 
THE VERIFICATIO·N TO THE INVENTORY AND AP-
PRAISEMENT FILED IN THE ESTATE OF MARK COOK. 
The apparent purpose of admitting in evidence the 
verification to the inventory and appraisement in the 
Mark Cook estate was to get before the court evidenee 
that Mark Cook gave the automobile to Mark B. Cook. 
Such evidence not only is a conclusion but offends 
against the provisions of U.'C.A. 1943, 104-49-2.. That 
Mark B. Cook is incompetent to testify as to transactions 
had between him and his father is clearly provided by 
subsection 3 o'f the above cited provision of our statute 
would seem clear. That being so he may not indirectly 
testify that the property listed in the inventory and 
app-raisement is all the property belonging to the es-
tate. To permit such testimony is in effect permitting 
him to testify that the automobile was not a part of the 
estate because the same was given to him. 
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''
7 e 1nention this matter at this tilne because if and 
when a new trial is had the trial court may repeat 
the error. 
It is sub1nitted that the judgment appealed froin 
be reversed and that the trial court be directed to enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the 
defendant for the sum of $800.00, the stipulated value 
of the automobile, or if that is not done that a new 




Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and A'(fJvpellants. 
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